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Background: The number of deceased donor organ donations in Israel is lower than average when compared to
other Western World countries. To address the organ gap, the 2008 Organ Transplantation Law provides new
interventions, including important incentives to donors (and their families). The most notable of these was granting
priority to registered donors (i.e., people on the waiting list who signed a donor card). The current study presents
the normative arguments as well as the first documentation of public attitudes in Israel towards another possible
incentive – allowing individuals to influence the allocation of their organs by permitting them to designate, to
direct their donated organs [DD] to other registered donors, instead of the current allocation based primarily on
medical criteria.
Methods: A structured phone survey of 695 Israelis was conducted during Feb-March 2012. The sample is representative
of the Israeli society in terms of age mix and gender, with adequate representation of the Arab and ultra-orthodox Jewish
subgroups.
Results: Among all Israelis, 68% stated a willingness to donate their organs, but only 16% reported to have already
signed a donor card. 85% stated their interest in receiving an organ if the need arises. Overall, 64% of respondents felt
that DD to a group of others who have registered as donors is justified, and the rate was remarkably higher in the Arab
group (84%), and lower in the religious and ultraorthodox Jewish groups (52% and 50% respectively).
Conclusions: The majority of the Israeli public supports organ donation and its proven benefits. Thus, organ recovery
policy should be grounded in a strong communitarian strategy as we all stand to benefit from cooperation. However,
current legislation and practices are modeled on individual disposition based on an opt-in legal framework. DD allows
personal choices of to-be donors that might interfere with social interests, principles, and values such as equal access to
care (i.e. organs) or justice. However, based on the result of this survey, the conceptual case of DD to other registered
donors should be viewed more favorably (while the details should be addressed in future analyses), as DD is not expected
to be rejected by the public at the outset. From a normative perspective, it is possible to support an allocation scheme
that allows DD to other registered donors, where individual preferences that promote just sharing of the burden
(donating organs) as well as the benefits (receiving an organ) of transplantation medicine are respected. Yet, DD
to other registered donors should be understood and portrayed as a transition step towards a more communitarian
model, and as a signal of solidarity by sharing organs as a public good rather than as an exercise of a quasi-property right.
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Ever since the possibility of saving lives by using others’
organs became a reality, delineating acceptable avenues
of retrieving these organs has been a matter of constant
debate. The discussion becomes ever more intense due
to an undeniable harsh truth – patients on waiting lists
for organs die only because we cannot find them the
vital organs they desperately need. Thus, the lethal
unsupplied demand creates an ethical and social impera-
tive to do better in meeting these patients’ needs [1].
The challenge is to design a policy that will increase the
supply of organs without significant secondary harms
(such as creating social segregation, increasing discrim-
ination, or engaging in unethical conducts such as
coerced retrieval).
Organs can be retrieved from live donors (in this case
only non-vital organs such as one kidney, or partial liver
or lung transplants), or from deceased donors, which
obviates the physical harm to live donors but is associ-
ated with a wide range of psychological, religious, and
behavioral obstacles to organ retrieval. This article per-
tains mostly to the latter option, and explores whether
granting individuals some level of control over the
disposition of their post-mortem organs (“directed,
designated donation”, hereinafter DD) can increase the
number of people willing to become donors, as family
members rarely disregard the explicit wishes of donor
card holders.
Several policies designed to increase organ dona-
tions have been implemented in recent years, includ-
ing easier ways to document a willingness to donate
(online registries, annexes to drivers’ license), massive
public awareness campaigns, increasing live donation
(mostly between family members), and offering various
non-pecuniary benefits (as monetary incentives were
rejected by most jurisdictions and international organi-
zations) [1].
For many years, Israel has ranked lower-than-average
in its retrieval rate from deceased donors; only 16% of
adult Israelis in relevant ages signed donor cards and
45% of families consent to deceased donation, yielding a
very low rate of 6-9 per million population (the current
population is around 8 million), compared to 35, 25, 17
in Spain, France and the U.K. respectively [2]. As a re-
sult, Israel faces a chronic state of unsatisfied demand,
with over 1,000 patients on the waiting list, some of
them for over 4 years. Approximately 100 Israelis die an-
nually only for the lack of a life-saving organ [3].
In 2008, the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) enacted a
new Organ Transplantation Law designed to increase
the performances and coordination of transplantation
medicine in Israel, and to increase the availability of
organs [4]. Among its provisions was an innovative
plan for creating incentives for both live donation anddeceased donation. Under the new law, live donors re-
ceive a uniform sum of money as compensation for the
monetary loss reasonably attributable to procedures as-
sociated with organ removal and for the reimburse-
ment of the donor’s expenses. In addition, donors are
exempt from paying the health tax for a significant
period of time and receive a Certificate of Recognition;
they are also exempt from entrance charges to national
parks.
As for deceased donors, the focus of this paper, the
National Organ Transplantation Center bears their bur-
ial costs. The law also authorizes the Health Ministry to
offer a reward to a person, or to his relative (either dur-
ing the person’s lifetime or after his death) for agreeing
to donate the deceased person’s organs. So far the
Health Ministry has only authorized reimbursement of
memorial expenses.
Importantly, the 2008 law authorizes the Steering
Committee of the National Organ Transplantation Cen-
ter to give priority to patients on the waiting list who
have signed a donor card, should they or a first-degree
relative need a transplant, as part of the effort to encour-
age the signing of donor cards and increase organ
donations [5]. In other words, for the first time, the allo-
cation criteria incorporate a non-medical criterion, a
step which raises ethical concerns [6]. This policy has
been in effect since April 2012, and during December
2012, a massive multilingual media campaign was launched
to inform the public of their chance to receive preferred
status on the waiting list by signing donor cards. The effect
of ‘preferred status’ on the size of the donors’ pool remains
to be studied, although early indications demonstrate a
positive effect [7].
Designated/directed donation
DD refers to the ability of a prospective donor to influ-
ence the allocation process by identifying designated
recipient/s. DD can be complete/inclusive (where all or-
gans are designated), whereas in partial DD the donor
indicates her wishes regarding the disposition of a par-
ticular organ, leaving other organs to the general alloca-
tion pool. The underlying supposition is that some
people refrain from donation because they do not know
who will receive their organs. Reasons for wanting to
designate vary – donating to a family member or a close
friend in need, to a member of my race/religion etc.
Clearly, it is easy to see how some of such reasons will
generate resistance (e.g., racial/ethnic preference) while
others seem [more] permissible (“first save my son”).
Such people will be more willing to donate their (or
their family member‘s) organs if the donor (or family
members) has the prerogative to designate or influence
who will be the recipient, as is currently the practice in
live donation. Such a prerogative seems problematic, [8]
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[9] multi-religious immigration society. Thus, carefully
carving acceptable criteria for designation becomes es-
sential [10].
We present the first documentation of public attitudes
towards DD in Israel, where the criterion for designation
is ‘DD to other Registered Donors’ [DDRD]. The desig-
nated group is open to all, thereby potentially negating
claims about allocation based on discrimination, racism,
social status etc. [11]. This is not the first probe of this
option: In the US, the National Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network recognizes the legitimacy of
DD, [12] and LifeShareres, an American nongovernmen-
tal organization, has been promoting DDRD, but with
very limited acceptance – after 10 years, only some
16,000 individuals have joined this initiative [11,13]. In
face of the inability to mobilize the American audience
toward DD, it is of interest to evaluate the extent to
which DD and DDRD resonate with the public in a dif-
ferent society.
One must differentiate ‘DD to other registered donors’
[DDRD] from ‘preferred status’ on the waiting list for
registered donors. While the advantages given to regis-
tered donors seem similar, there are important differ-
ences between the two options. First, the locus of
decision changes – while in ‘preferred status’ the allocat-
ing body accepts the donor’s organs and allocates them
according to its criteria (which now include preferred
status to organ card holders), DD allows the donor-to-be
to shape the process and to exert some discretion on
who gets her organs, an important demonstration of au-
tonomy while she is alive (a will-like power). Second,
‘preferred status’ merely adds points to a candidate, and
will be the decisive factor only if both candidates’ med-
ical criteria are similar (same number of points by the
allocation algorithm). In DD, someone lower on the
waiting list but part of the “registered donors” club
should get these organs first. While this might seem
harsh at first sight, the corrective measure is simple –
join the club (which is open to all). Finally, DDRD
brings more forcefully to light the collective engagement
needed to overcome the organ shortage –if we all pro-
spectively join in, we all stand a much higher chance to
get an organ if the need arises. Preferred status seems to
reflect more of an individual risk management – the
registration aims at improving individual’s chances over
others’. DDRD attempts to minimize free riding on a
larger, social scale by restricting non-donors’ access to
organs.Methods and study design
(For detailed description of the methodology see Appendix
1 and Figure 1):A structured phone survey of 695 Israelis containing
26 questions was conducted by Dahaf – Public Opinion
Research Institute, Tel Aviv, during Feb-March 2012.
The sample is representative of Israeli society in terms
of age mix and gender (confidence level 95%, confidence
interval 4%) with adequate representation of the Arabs
and ultra-orthodox Jews subgroups. By ‘Israelis’ I refer
to a legal status of individuals registered as being citizens
of the State of Israel, being subject to its laws and being
educated and cared for by Israel’s social institutions, in-
cluding the healthcare system and its organ allocation
scheme. The reader should bear in mind that Israel is a
multiethnic and multi religious society. Many presump-
tions about “what do Arabs/Jews think about…” require
empirical data, in order to focus educational attempt in
a meaningful way, and not across the board, or to attune
public campaigns to sensitivities of different subgroups.
The questionnaire data collection: Interviews were car-
ried out during February - March 2012 using a comput-
erized telephone system (CATI). Immigrants not fluent
in Hebrew were interviewed in Russian, and Arabs were
interviewed in Arabic. Each telephone number sampled
was tried up to 3 times, at different days and hours.
Only after 3 unanswered calls was another phone num-
ber substituted. Rate of success (finishing the entire sur-
vey) out of all telephone number sampled was 38%. To
reduce the risk of bias and to maintain adequate sample
representation, non-respondents were replaced by per-
sons from the same sub-group/strata. There might still
be some degree of bias if, within a strata, there is a cor-
relation between the tendency to respond to phone sur-
veys and attitudes toward organ donation.
Results
In the following, the results presented reflect the entire
Israeli public sample, unless a subgroup is specified.
Awareness of the organ shortage
80 per cent of respondents were aware of the organ
shortage in Israel – 83% among Jews, 64% among Arabs.
Among Jews, the less religious were more aware of the
shortage (religious and ultraorthodox Jewish 75 and 55%
respectively).
Willingness to donate, willingness to receive
Among all Israelis, 68 per cent stated they are willing to
donate their organs – 66% among Jews (57% among
former USSR immigrants and only 14% of Ultraorthodox
Jews), and 77% among Arabs. However, only 16% said
that they already had signed donor cards. The percent-
age of card holders in our study is comparable with the
actual donor card holder rate in the National registry,
which is a positive indication of our research sensitivity
and representativeness.
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interest in receiving an organ if the need arises. It is
particularly noteworthy that 65% of those who stated
their refusal to donate were still interested in receiving
organs.Attitudes towards priority status offered to registered
donors
Among the entire sample, 55 per cent of the sample re-
ported they have heard about the new law offering prior-
ity to registered donors. The comparable figure was only
38% among orthodox Jews, with no differences between
former USSR immigrants or Arabs. Among the respon-
dents who had not yet signed a donor card (84%), an im-
portant target for mobilization efforts, 44% stated that
the law increased their willingness to donate, while 31%
stated that it did not have this effect. The increase is
noted primarily among those who did not sign a donor
card but who have stated earlier that they are willing to
donate their organ, and not among those who are un-
willing to commit to donation (modest effect).1. The need for organs in Israel
2. The willingness to donate organs after d
3. Did you sign a donor card?
4. Support for preferred status for donor c
5. Does preferred status increase willingne
6. Opinion re Directed Donation
a. "a new law is being proposed th
to direct their post mortem organ
donor card. Only if no match i
these organs will be offered to 
just?" 
7. Does DD increases willingness to dona
8. Specific scenarios of DD: 
a. to a family member
b. to others who have signed donor
c. other categories
9. Is altruism in organ donation importan
10. Do preferred status or Directed donatio
11. The willingness to be a recipient
Figure 1 Main items surveyed.Attitudes towards designated donation to other
registered donors
64 per cent of the sample felt that DD to others regis-
tered as donors is justified (see Table 1). Remarkably, the
support was significantly higher in the Arab group
(84%), and lower in the religious and ultraorthodox
Jewish groups (52% and 50% respectively).
In respect to partial DD to a family member in
need, 81 per cent found it justified (92% of Arabs,
72% Ultraorthodox Jewish respondents).
Assessing the impact of DD on the willingness of our
sampled participants to sign a donor card among re-
spondents who have not done so thus far, 52% stated it
will significantly increase their willingness to sign (27%
greatly increase, 25% increase). Importantly, another
28% stated that DD will not increase nor decrease their
willingness to sign a donor card (thus DDRD does not
seem to create a backlash). Breaking down the impact of
the possibility to designate organs per group, DDRD had
a positive effect on 44% of the Jewish population (20%
greatly increase, 24% increase); 80% of the Arab popu-
lation (51% greatly increase, 29% increase); and 44% ineath
ard holders
ss to donate
at allows individuals who sign a donor card 
s to other individuals who have also signed a 
s found in the group of donor card signers, 




n harm the altruism principle
Table 1 Attitudes towards designated donation to other







Highly justified 22 25 25 18 13
Justified 42 59 40 34 37
Not justified 18 9 19 22 19
Highly unjustified 11 1 10 21 14
No answer 7 6 6 5 17
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100
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increase).
Reasons for objecting to DD (29% of the entire sam-
ple) – 38% of those objecting DD stated that allocation
should be based solely on medical needs, 25% felt that
potential donors who would donate without signing a
card should not be disadvantaged, 27% stated it is
unfair/unethical (without specifications), and 1% stated
that the willingness to donate should remain without
consideration.
Discussion
DD allows the prospective donor to exert some degree of
control over his organs [14]. The practical implications of
such an authority was evaluated by our survey. The results
demonstrate that abiding to donors’ wishes can augment
the number of potential donors, most notably in the Arab
population of individuals who have thus far refrained
for registering their consent to donate (80%). Thus,
from a utilitarian perspective it is warranted.
However, a policy must also meet other requirements,
including practicality, political feasibility and ethical
scrutiny. In this article I shall consider the ethical issues,
leaving the issues of practicality and political feasibility
to others. This being said, the survey results play at least
two important roles: they strengthen the case for DDRD
by showing that it would be likely to increase organ do-
nation rates. Our findings are particularly important in
light of the discouraging US experience with Lifeshares.
One might speculate that the lack of endorsement by
the government plays a chilling effect on the willingness
of individuals to join a private initiative in a delicate
matter such as post mortem organs. They also increase
our confidence in the political feasibility of the proposed
change, as they demonstrate public support for it.
Ethical objection to DD rests on the following argu-
ments: First, organs should be allocated based solely on
objective medical criteria, which in turn reflects a per-
ception of an altruistic donation and allocation system
where the donor is permitting social agents (allocation
committees) to administer just distribution of a scarce
collective good. DDRD introduces a motivating factor(which restrict access to those who refuse or fail to par-
ticipate in the consenting pool), which could be regarded
as harming altruism, a notion strongly reigning in the
organ donation discourse [15]. Second, the direct result
of allowing DD is a discriminatory system, as it gives
some individuals or groups (based on the type of desig-
nation at work) better access to a limited resource [16].
The downstream effect could be social segregation or
even alienation, if patterns of cooperation or shirking
would be grouped-based.
Such claims raise serious issues and require due atten-
tion. However, I would argue that most of them are not
applicable under a well-intended, well-structured DD
scheme, such as DDRD – directing my organs to peers
who have chosen to undertake (if and when it becomes
relevant) the same act of donation. First, Western bio-
ethics adheres strongly to individual autonomy. Allowing
individuals to designate their estate (use my money for
X or Y) or to some extent their organs (to other regis-
tered donors) seems to be an act that extends individual
autonomy in yet another regard. Indeed, our insistence
on ‘consent to donation’ as oppose to ‘routine removal’
of cadaveric organs [17,18] is closely aligned with such
recognition. Arguing that organs should be allocated
solely on some socially agreed-upon criteria is strongly
promoting the idea that my organs are actually a collect-
ive good. If this is the case – our loyalty to individual
consent (opt in) should be diminished altogether, allow-
ing some external interest (saving life, avoiding suffering,
and reducing expenses) to have their say. In addition, we
allow live donors to designate their organs as part of
their autonomy, and it is hard to justify a complete re-
traction from some sort of individual’s control over his
post-mortem organs (some retraction is defensible, as
the live donor is putting himself at physical risk).
Second, altruism should be an ideal guide in many
policy-making. However, a more realistic stance should
reflect the understanding of the power and limitations of
altruism. Indeed, the current deficiency is a vivid testi-
mony to the insufficient clout of a strict “altruism-
driven” scheme. Moreover, at the outset, it is not clear
that DD, and especially DDRD (‘DD to other registered
donors’) is actually harming altruism. The ability to dir-
ect one’s organs does not constitute an overt consider-
ation, and a remote “benefit” to a donor (fulfilling his
designation), especially in the circumstances of partial
DD, seems over-righteous. In addition, it is almost im-
possible to assess “altruism” of donors under current
policies (e.g., do we really question live donation among
family members even though ample evidence point to
near-coercion states in some cases?). Moreover, altruism
has a negative impact on free riders – if all stand to
benefit, some (or many) need not carry any burden, even
though they would have opted-in if the stakes were high
Table 2 Age distribution










Siegal Israel Journal of Health Policy Research 2014, 3:1 Page 6 of 8
http://www.ijhpr.org/content/3/1/1enough (i.e. the risk of being ineligible to receive an
organ). The important contribution of DDRD is to
reinforce the idea of “reciprocal altruism”— a public rec-
ognition of reciprocal obligation and interdependency in
the transplantation domain (“we can all have a much
higher chance of getting an organ if we all remain in the
consenting pool”) that has been obscured by decades of
exclusive emphasis on altruism and the “gift of life” [1].
Finally, the risk of discrimination must be confronted.
DD is limited and directed towards sustaining donation
—the permitted designated recipient groups refers to a
group that is open to all, irrespective of social status,
wealth, race, religion and similarly frowned upon cri-
teria. For that very reason, DDRD should not be applied
to minors or non-competent adults— they would be in-
cluded in the eligible recipient group, as they should not
be disadvantaged due to the inactions/omission of their
guardians. Our suggested criterion is positively related
to donation (i.e. not a whim or mal-intended) and is
truly fair, as all Israeli citizens enjoy a national health
care (unlike the American case, where all can be donors
but only those with adequate insurance stand to receive
organs). Thus, DD of one’s organs to the group of people
like her, who agreed to share their organs, seems to me
less objectionable.
As stated earlier in the introduction, DD to other regis-
tered donors [DDRD] is different from ‘preferred status’ on
the waiting list for registered donors. While ‘preferred sta-
tus’ only adds some points to a candidate, and will be the
decisive factor only if both candidates’ medical criteria are
similar, DD gives priority to someone lower on the waiting
list, but who is part of the “registered donors” club. The
corrective measure is simple – join the consenting club
which is open to all. In such a scheme, DDRD could
minimize free riding (accepting without willing to donate)
by restricting access to organs to non-participants. In our
study, 44% stated that preferred status increases their will-
ingness to donate, and 64% felt that way about DDRD. It
seems safe to assume that without the existence of ‘pre-
ferred status’ (which already advantages to some extent
prospective donors), the effect of introducing DD could
have been even higher.
Legal scrutiny of DD through the prism of current
laws of the State of Israel is beyond the scope of this art-
icle and was presented in our recent project [19]. Suffice
is to say that the gamut of laws pertaining to organ do-
nation, healthcare rights, patients rights, and the Basic
Laws on human rights do not preclude DD. Designated
donation is permitted in live donation, and the Trans-
plantation Law of 2008 does not ban deceased DD.
Conclusion
Ideally, organ recovery policy would be grounded in a strat-
egy that heralds and enhances cooperation (presumedconsent) with an opportunity to opt out [20]. However, we
now have a model of individual disposition based on an
opt-in legal framework. DD represents a fascinating case
study with the potential for a clash between personal
choices (and the right for self-determination in life and
upon death) on the one hand, and on the other hand social
interests and values such as equality, parity and justice in
policy making [14]. This paper provides needed data and
normative arguments to support an allocation scheme that
allows DDRD, where individual preferences that promote
just sharing of the burden of donating organs as well as the
benefits of transplantation medicine are respected, and that
is likely to produce a higher proportion of prospective
donors.
While beneficial in the short run, this approach could
be problematic in the long run if it reinforces the exist-
ing moral and legal autonomy-driven model. If the DD
approach were adopted, it should be understood and
portrayed as a transition step toward a more communi-
tarian model, and as a signal of solidarity of sharing of
the organs as a public good rather than as an exercise of
a quasi-property right (i.e., a limited right to decide over
organ donation without a right to generate other gains),
similar to the right given to the family to authorize or
decline organ donation [1]. Indeed, the wished-for desig-
nated group should be as large as possible – hopefully
the entire population. To this end, the legislator should
opt for a legal rule that would make most people partici-
pate in the consenting pool. Identifying such a target
points to the presumed consent/opt out default [1-18].
Finally, caution should be employed when attempting to
generalize the results of the Israeli case to other soci-
eties. While the ethical analysis may stand ethical scru-
tiny, demonstration surveys in other countries are
needed to assess the social support in each society.
Appendix 1
Research populations and samples
The population was defined as “all Israeli adult (age 18+)
who are citizens”. Age distribution is represented in
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700 interviewees was drawn. The sample was drawn using
strata sampling method. Strata was defined by the following
criteria: 1) Sector - Immigrants from the former Soviet
Union that arrived in Israel since 1990 (hereafter cited as
“immigrants”), Ultra orthodox Jews, Jewish residents in the
West Bank (Settlers), Kibbutz members, other Jews, Arabs);
2) Characteristics of town of residence (Geographical area
and size of town, according the categorization of Israeli
CBS); 3) Gender. Sample size defined by Israel population
(8 million), confidence level 95%, confidence interval 4%.
Sampling immigrants applied the following additional
criteria: 1) Republic of origin (Christian Vs. Islamic re-
publics); 2) Year of immigration. Sampling in the Arab
sector applied additional criteria: 1) Profile of town of
residence; 2) religion: Moslem, Christian and Druze.
From each stratum a random sample was drawn. Each
stratum was presented in the sample according to its
proportion in the population.
The questionnaires
The structured questionnaire contained 26 questions. It
was translated to Russian and Arabic, and checked by
back translation from Russian/Arabic to Hebrew. The
original translation and the back translation were made
by different persons.
Data collection
Interviews were carried out by during February - March
2012 using computerized telephone system (CATI).
Immigrants not fluent in Hebrew were interviewed in
Russian, Arabs were interviewed in Arabic. Each tele-
phone number sampled was tried up to 3 times, at dif-
ferent days and hours. Only after 3 unanswered calls a
substitute number was addressed. In cases of refusal, the
“convincing efforts” adopted by Dahaf institute were ad-
ministered. Interviewee who wanted to terminate the
interview before completing the questionnaire was asked
for his permission to address him later or the next day
to complete the interview. Rate of success out of all
telephone number sampled was 38%. To avoid bias and to
maintain adequate sample representation, non-respondents
were replaced by persons from the same sub-group/strata.
Instructing the interviewers
All interviewers were face-to-face instructed in groups
of up to 20 interviewers. Instruction was carried out in
the following stages: Each interviewer read the question-
naire. One of the interviewers served as a “pretending
interviewee” and was interviewed in front of the other
interviewers. The pretending interviewer was instructed
to give the real interviewer problematic responses (ask
difficult questions, give contradicting answers, criticize
the questionnaire, etc.). The instructor summarized allthe problematic points and instructed the interviewers
how to deal with them. The first 3 questionnaires of
each interviewer were checked before proceeding with
work. The check referred mainly to missing data or con-
tradictions. Upon completion of data logical checks were
carried out. During actual interviews, interviewers were
monitored. An interviewer didn’t know when the super-
visor was monitoring him. After the interviewer com-
pleted relevant questionnaire, the supervisor addressed
him and presented corrections, if required.
Controlling order-effect bias
A preliminary evaluation of possible order effect (were
the sequence of items in a survey influences the re-
sponder’s attitudes) was carried by Dahaf ’s statistical
team. The pilot version was tested for such sequencing
effect. To de-bias possible effect, identified questions
were introduced in random sequence.
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